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Farm Price Estimation When There is
Bargaining: The Case  of Processed
Fruit and Vegetables
Ben  C. French
Raw product prices  for many processed fruits and vegetables are  determined in part as
an outcome of negotiations  between processors  and farmer  bargaining associations.  In
such cases,  unique market equilibrium  solutions  may not exist. This study develops a
framework for price prediction under bargaining and applies  it to the California cling
peach industry. The price prediction  equation  turns out to involve the same variables
as would  a model specified for perfect competition.  Hence a mistaken assumption
about the structure of competition  may still provide  a model that predicts well,
provided  the structure remains constant.
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Many U.S.-produced  fruits and vegetables are
marketed  through  farmer  associations  whose
primary function is to bargain with processors
over prices of the raw product and other terms
of trade. In 1982 there were ten fruit and nine-
teen  vegetable  bargaining  associations  in the
United  States,  eighteen  of  the  twenty-nine
located  in  the  western  states  of California,
Oregon,  and  Washington  (Skinner).  Because
bargaining  implies  some  type  of oligopsony-
oligopoly  structure,  derived  grower-level
demand functions may not exist for these com-
modities  (as  they do  under  perfect  competi-
tion). Each processing  firm may take account
of how its procurement price is affected by the
quantity  purchased and possibly by the reac-
tions of its rivals.  Many behavioral  specifica-
tions  are possible.  With  the bargaining  asso-
ciation simultaneously  attempting  to act as  a
cartel, it may be  impossible to  define unique
equilibrium  solutions  for  the  raw  product
prices.1 This presents  a difficult  problem  for
econometric  modelers.
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1  The  case  of bilateral  oligopsony  is not well  developed in the
literature.  For a  simple illustration  of the  problem  in  terms  of
The  objective  of this paper is to develop  a
framework  for specifying  and  estimating  the
structural components of a model that predicts
the outcomes when there is a bargaining pro-
cess. The empirical performance of the model
is examined in an application to the California
cling  peach industry.
Bargaining Structure
Farmer bargaining associations  are voluntary
cooperatives  organized  to  give  individual
farmers  a greater voice  and (hopefully)  more
power  in  dealing  with  what,  for most  com-
modities, is a relatively small number of pro-
cessor buyers. These associations are a type of
cartel that controls the disposition of  the mem-
bers' product but has no control over the quan-
tity produced. Individual farmer members be-
have approximately  as perfect  competitors in
production;  i.e., they generally do not take ac-
count of the possible effect of their own output
on the price received.
Bargaining  associations  operate  in  diverse
ways.  Most commonly,  they do not take title
to the  raw product  but they do require  their
monopsony and bilateral  monopoly, see Miller, p. 371; Henderson
and Quandt,  pp. 222-26.
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members  to  sign  exclusive  marketing  agree-
ments designating  the  association  as the  sole
sales agent. A farmer may be free to sell to the
processor of  his/her choice provided the farmer
conforms to the terms established by the bar-
gaining  association.  However,  bargaining  as-
sociations  deal  only  with  private  (noncoop-
erative)  processors  (see  Bunje  for further
description of bargaining processes). The share
of individual-crop supply represented by bar-
gaining associations varies widely among com-
modities and often from year to year,  ranging
from  less  than  10%  to  as much  as  80%  (see
Skinner for greater  detail).
Theoretical Foundations
The basic theoretical  considerations  involved
in grower-processor  bargaining  for  fruits and
vegetables  were  laid  out  by Helmberger  and
Hoos about twenty years ago. Later, Ladd ex-
tended the Helmberger-Hoos  analysis  to pro-
vide a mathematical  model  of bargaining be-
havior  under  alternative  objective  functions
and specifications; and Babb, Belden, and Saa-
thoff analyzed  the  factors  that  affected  out-
comes  in an  actual bargaining situation.  In a
somewhat  more historical and literary  analy-
sis, Bunje has described the strategies, tactics,
and procedures of price negotiations based on
his many years  of experience as  a bargaining
association  manager.  Although  the last  three
papers provide additional insights into the bar-
gaining process and conditions for farmer suc-
cess, the seminal work of  Helmberger and Hoos
provides the main foundations for the analysis
to follow.
For analytical purposes it is useful to distin-
guish three types of bargaining situations:  (a)
processors  behave  as  price  takers  while  the
bargaining association  behaves as a cartel; (b)
processor procurement is characterized by oli-
gopsony, while  the bargaining  association be-
haves as  a price  taker;  (c)  processor  procure-
ment involves oligopsony, and at the same time
the bargaining association attempts to act as a
cartel.
Case I. Price-  Taking Buyers- Cartel Sellers
Helmberger  and  Hoos  noted that  if there  is
pure  competition  in procurement,  there is no
basis for a bargaining process; the association
would need merely announce its terms. In this
case a price-prediction  model may be obtained
by specifying the derived  farm-level  demand
function (which clearly exists in this case) and
a function to describe  the price-setting behav-
ior of the association. 2
Case II. Oligopsony Procurement-Price-
Taking Sellers
In  cases  where  the  bargaining  association  is
dominated by oligopsonistic processor buyers,
there is no conceptual problem in specifying a
supply relationship,  but specifying a model to
describe processor behavior presents substan-
tial difficulties.  Oligopsony embraces  a broad
class  of market  structures,  and  there  are  no
generally  accepted  behavioral  assumptions,
particularly  no  universal  assumptions  con-
cerning reactions of rivals.
Helmberger and Hoos approached the prob-
lem by treating the oligopsonists as a colluding
monopsony with individual-firm marginal net
revenue product curves horizontally summed
to  form  an  aggregate  marginal  net  revenue
product curve comparable to the marginal net
revenue product curve of a monopsonist.  The
quantity of raw product purchased  is then de-
termined  by the intersection  of the  aggregate
marginal  net revenue  product  curve  and  the
marginal input cost curve, and the price is set
according to the supply curve. The general ap-
plicability of  the restrictive assumptions of  this
model  might  be  questioned;  but  even if ac-
cepted,  the  model  leaves  us  with  the  same
problem  as  pure  monopsony-i.e.,  it  is  not
possible  to  define  a unique  relationship  be-
tween  farm price and quantity of raw product
purchased.
A plausible (and more tractable) oligopsony
model  is that of dominant-firm  price  leader-
ship.  Applying  this  specification  to the  Cali-
fornia  processing  tomato  industry,  Just  and
Chern showed that if supply behavior is com-
petitive  and  the  supply curve  shifts  in level
only (slope constant),  market observations  of
prices and quantities trace out what they called
a "perceived"  demand curve.  This curve falls
below the demand  curve  farmers  would face
2 Under  competition,  the  input demand  function  for  the  raw
farm product expresses  quantity as a function of the price  of the
farm product, the prices of other inputs, and the expected price  or
prices of the processed  products. The latter  may be expressed  as
functions of  observable variables such as quantity processed, carry-
in stocks, population,  income, and other demand shift variables.
Substituting  in the input  demand  function  and aggregating  then
provides the farm-level demand  function.
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if processors  behaved  as perfect competitors.
If the  slope  of the  supply  curve changes,  the
slope of the perceived demand curve changes.
The  Just-Chern  model  establishes  a struc-
tural  relationship  between  farm  price  and
quantity  which  can  be  estimated  along  with
the supply function (simultaneously in the case
of tomatoes) by using data for periods in which
the  slope  of the  supply  curve  and  the  price
leadership  practice  remain  unchanged.  The
perceived demand function is likely to include
the same variables as would be included in a
farm-level  demand  function  under  perfect
competition in procurement and farm sales.
Case III. Bilateral  Oligopsony-Oligopoly
In the case where both processors and the bar-
gaining association attempt to act as price set-
ters, the market equilibrium mechanism breaks
down.  Helmberger and Hoos show that,  as in
the  case  of bilateral  monopoly,  the best that
can be done is to define a price-quantity  space
that will contain the final bargained-for  price-
quantity  solution. The size of this subspace  is
influenced by the degree of competition among
buyers; the greater the competition,  the small-
er the  space.
The location  of price within the bargaining
space may be influenced on the grower side by
bargaining  tactics,  share  of industry  volume
represented by the cooperative,  the price elas-
ticities of demand and nonmember supply, le-
gal protections, and environmental  factors such
as the degree of specialization and grower flex-
ibility,  including  availability  of  alternative
markets.  On the processor side, the bargaining
outcome may be affected by the extent of prod-
uct  diversification,  geographic  nature  of op-
erations,  financial  strength,  and the  extent of
cooperative  processing  operations  in  the  in-
dustry.3
3 A reviewer  of an earlier draft  of this paper suggested that the
theory of contestable markets developed by Baumol,  Panzer, and
Willig might  be applicable  to this case.  The key  characteristic of
contestable markets is  costless entry and exit. When such  condi-
tions exist,  excess profits will be squeezed  out and  prices will  be
forced  to the  competitive  norm, even  under  oligopoly.  Growers
can easily  move in and out of a bargaining  association,  and entry
and exit of new growers  into the  industry may  involve relatively
low costs. Hence, the grower market may be potentially contestable
although with some  lag caused by grower  loyalties,  uncertainties,
and time required  for new perennial crop production.  Processing
operations, on the other hand, involve high sunk costs. As pointed
out by Spence,  this gets  in the way of hit-and-run entry, which  is
the cornerstone of contestable markets. It would appear then that
contestable market theory has limited applicability in raw product
markets that involve  bargaining.  This topic may,  however, merit
further study.
Case  III  presents  a  difficult  problem  for
quantitative  policy  analysis  or projection  be-
cause  some  measure  of the relation  of farm
price to output is usually required. A practical
approach  to  this problem-and  the  one  fol-
lowed here-is to specify and estimate a func-
tion in which raw product price  is the depen-
dent variable and the explanatory variables are
those which may influence the position of the
space within which price bargaining occurs and
the  location  of price  within  the  bargaining
space.
A Price-Prediction  Model
The California cling peach industry appears to
fall into the category  of Case III, bilateral oli-
gopsony-oligopoly.  There  are  relatively  few
processors,  and there is a long-established bar-
gaining association.  The remainder of this pa-
per develops a farm-price-predicting  equation
appropriate  for the  specific  conditions of this
industry.  However,  extension  or modification
for  other processed-commodity  industries  is
straightforward.
Industry Characteristics
Clingstone peaches are the primary peach uti-
lized  for canning.  They  are produced  only in
California in significant quantities and are uti-
lized  almost  exclusively  for  processing.  The
California Canning Peach Association (CCPA),
often cited as one of  the more successful farmer
bargaining  associations,  has  bargained  with
peach  processors  since  before World  War II.
The share of industry  tonnage represented by
the  association  has fluctuated within  a range
of about 40%  to  70%,  but without any  clear
trend. Although the CCPA does not control all
of the industry tonnage,  its  negotiations with
processors tend to set the farm price (or at least
the minimum price) for the entire industry (see
Minami,  French,  and King, p.  11).
Because of  declining markets, land allocated
to cling peach production has decreased from
a high of 85,000 total acres in 1968  to a little
over 33,000 acres in 1984. The number of pro-
cessing firms dropped from  15 in 1974 to only
8 in 1984.  There  is very little backward inte-
gration of processors  into farming,  but coop-
erative  canners  have  processed  an increasing
share of industry tonnage. In spite of  the major
changes in industry size, the role of the CCPA
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appears to have remained relatively stable.  Its
market  share  and  general  bargaining  proce-
dures  have  not  varied  systematically.  There
have been some variations in strategy (e.g., use
of sliding  scale  contracts that related  price  to
industry volume in some years), but no great
changes  in relative  market power and overall
bargaining position are clearly evident.
The  total  supply  of  peaches  potentially
available  for  canning  each  year  is  predeter-
mined by the amount of  bearing acreage avail-
able for harvest and natural factors which af-
fect yields. During most of the period from the
1950s to 1972, the quantity harvested and sold
to  canners  was  affected  by  various  volume-
control  marketing-order  programs  (see  Mi-
nami,  French,  and  King).  The  CCPA  had  a
substantial influence,  through its member rep-
resentatives,  on the marketing-order  policies
pertaining  to  quantities  surplused  (not  mar-
keted) and this, in turn, affected grower prices.
However,  the  surplusing  decisions,  accom-
plished mainly by "green-drop"  requirements,
were  generally  set prior to the completion  of
the CCPA price bargaining process. Therefore,
the quantity sold to processors was essentially
predetermined with respect to price, although
in selected  years this may not have held pre-
cisely.
Since  1972, the industry has operated with-
out  market  controls,  and  the  quantity  pur-
chased  by  canners  has  been  essentially  the
quantity  produced.  The  CCPA  has obtained
its bargaining strength from the potential threat
of withholding  from  individual  canners  and
from a provision in the California Agricultural
Code which specifies that growers are entitled
to "fair"  prices.  Failure to agree  is subject to
adjudication.4 In 1981 the CCPA did affect the
total quantity  produced  by paying for a vol-
untary tree removal incentive program which
later influenced the level of  the negotiated price.
However, the removals were not directly a part
of the  negotiation  process.  Overall,  total  in-
dustry pack decisions have been dominated by
the predetermined  supply.
Model Specification
In the classical bilateral monopoly model,  the
upper limit of the bargaining range is defined
4 In  at least one  year the price  was not finally established  until
after  the canning season ended.  It was settled by an outside arbi-
trator to avoid costly  court battles.
by the marginal revenue  product curve of the
buyer-an expected function in the case of  pro-
cessed fruits and vegetables.  Because the com-
petitive  structure  in  the  processed-product
market  may  be  unclear,  the  maximum  raw
product price may be defined more generally
as  the  expected  FOB price  for the  processed
product or products less  the expected  cost of
transformation  and storage, converted to raw
product equivalents. The negotiated farm price
then is the maximum  price less an increment
(M  - 0) determined by the nature of compe-
tition in the processed-product market and the
bargaining structure.  That is,
(1)  PF  = C(EPP - EPC  - M),
where PF  is the raw product price, C is a fixed
technical conversion ratio between the raw and
processed  product,  EPP  is the  expected price
of the processed  product,  and EPC is the ex-
pected processing  and storage cost per unit of
processed product  excluding the raw product
cost.
Under perfect competition in both sales and
procurement,  M  =  0 except  for possible  risk
discounting.  If the processed-product  market
is imperfect,  the  upper limit of farm  price  is
defined with respect to expected marginal rev-
enue,  so M may be  greater than zero even  if
procurement  is competitive.  The value  of M
increases  with increases in processor  bargain-
ing strength relative to that of the association.
If several processed products were made from
the  single raw product,  EPP  and EPC would
refer to a weighted average of prices and costs.
The  farm  price  prediction  equation  is deter-
mined by specifying the relation of EPP, EPC,
and M to observable variables.
Expected FOB price and processing cost.
Processors  are  assumed  to behave  rationally
in the  sense  that they take account  of a  per-
ceived  supply  and  demand  structure  for the
processed  product  when  forming  their  price
expectations.  Their  perceptions  need  not be
precisely correct. The processor-level  demand
and supply structure for canned cling peaches
(and other processed  fruits and vegetables  as
well)  consists of three types of jointly related
equations: (a) the FOB demand function facing
processors;  (b)  a  function  that  sets the  FOB
price,  with  quantities  not  sold  at  that  price
carried to the next season; and (c) a carryover-
stock  identity.  These functions pertain to the
processed-product  marketing  year,  which  be-
gins just before the harvest and processing sea-
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son, June  1  for cling peaches.  The raw-product
price is normally  established  in the spring  or
early  summer prior to the marketing  year.  It
is assumed that  the equations  of this system
may be approximated by linear functions with
price-level  and  population  changes  incorpo-
rated by expressing all price and cost variables
in deflated values and all quantities in U.S. per
capita values.
The demand function (or functions) includes
deflated  marketing-year  price  (PPD,) and per
capita sales (QMN,) as endogenous  variables,
plus other variables which processors may view
as indicators of shifts in the level of per capita
demand.  The latter,  designated  by  W for the
moment,  are  treated  as  exogenous  or  prede-
termined.
A study by French  and King  suggests  that
cling  peach  processors  tend  to  set  the  FOB
prices at which they offer canned products to
cover the processing cost per unit (PCDt) plus
the previously incurred cost of  the raw product
(PFD/,C), with further modification based on
the level of per capita seasonal  supply (quan-
tity packed plus stocks carried in, QPN, + SNt)
and the current movement (QMNt). They treat
PCD, as an exogenous variable,  and PFD,  and
QPN, +  SN,  are  predetermined  with  respect
to the processed-product  marketing year.
The  third endogenous  variable  of the  sys-
tem, quantity carried out, is determined by the
identity:
SNt+ l = QPN, + SN,-  QMN,.
The  reduced-form  equation  for  the  FOB
processed-product  price  obtained  from  this
perceived  simultaneous  system  is
(2)  PPD, = ao + aPCD, + a2PFD,
+ a3(QPN, + SN,)  + a, 4W  + u,,
where  u is a random  variable  assumed to be
distributed  independently  of the  explanatory
variables,  and the  other variables  are  as  de-
fined above. The variables  on the right are all
predetermined  (known  to  processors)  in  the
marketing  year  for  the  processed  product.
However,  at the time the raw product price is
established,  stocks  carried  into  the new  year
(SN,), unit processing cost (PCDt), and the level
of demand (reflected by W) are not known. An
expression for the expected processed-product
price  (EPPD) is  obtained  by  specifying  and
inserting processor projection models for each
of the variables whose values are unknown.
Because  processed-product inventory levels
are monitored  frequently,  the level of begin-
ning  stocks  (on  June  1 for peaches)  can  be
projected  accurately  at the time  of price  bar-
gaining.  Therefore,  SN,  may  be  regarded  as
known.  The processing cost is likely to be pro-
jected  closely  from  the  value  the  previous
year-i.e.,  projected  PCD,  =  ¢PCD,_1  +  e,
where  e, is a random  variable.
Demand  shifters,  represented  by  W,  nor-
mally  would include  factors  such as personal
income and prices of substitute commodities.
In  the  case  of  cling  peaches,  however,  the
downward  effects  of changing  consumer pref-
erences  tend  to overwhelm  all other  shifters.
Processor  perceptions  of such  shifts  are  as-
sumed to  be  captured  by  replacing  W with
lagged values of average per capita  consump-
tion, measured by a two-year average of com-
bined per capita movement of canned peaches
and fruit cocktail  [QTMN2 =  1/2(QTMNt_  +
QTMNt_2)]. The  supply of competing  canned
fruits  was  also  included  as  a  variable  in  an
initial  formulation  but proved  to  be  nonsig-
nificant,  probably  because  the  final  value  of
such supplies is uncertain at the time the cling
peach price is established.
Beginning in 1974, all peach prices and costs
moved abruptly to new  levels  that cannot be
explained  by the  changes in the  general price
level or accounted for by changes in supply. A
reasonable hypothesis is that it was a result of
changed  expectations  associated with the  be-
ginning  of double-digit inflation and a period
of energy  shortages.  Similar shifts  have been
observed  for a number of other canned  fruit
and  vegetable  commodities.  The  procedure
used to  reflect  this  shift  was  to introduce  a
dummy variable,  D74, which  has  a value  of
zero for all years prior to  1974 and  1.0 there-
after.  Variations  which  allowed  the  effect  of
the dummy shifter  to decline over time were
also considered,  but they did not perform  as
well.
With these considerations, the expected FOB
processed-product  price may be expressed as
(3) EPPD,  = ao + aOPCD,tl + a2PFD,
+ a3(QPN, + SN,)  + a4QTMN2,
+ asD74 + (ae,  + u,).
Determinants ofM. M  is a random variable
whose  mean  value  is  determined  by the un-
derlying  structural  characteristics  of the bar-
gaining environment. Annual values may fluc-
tuate around the mean as a result of variations
in bargaining strategies and conditions.  If pro-
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cessors are very competitive,  M may be near
zero. As processor power increases relative to
bargaining association  power, the value  of M
increases.  Measurable  factors associated  with
changes  in relative  bargaining  strength could
be the share of industry volume controlled by
the bargaining  association and the concentra-
tion of processors. In the case of cling peaches,
it is possible that termination of the volume-
control marketing-order program in 1972 could
also have affected the mean value of M.  How-
ever,  an  association  of these particular  mea-
sures with the farm price could not be detected.
If the mean  of M is  stationary,  it enters  the
farm-price-predicting  equation only as a com-
ponent  of the  intercept  and  the  disturbance
term.
It seems  likely that M may  also  vary with
the  level  of  supply  and  previous-year  pro-
cessed-product  prices  and  processing  cost.
When the seasonal supply is large M may de-
crease.  Processors may be willing to  settle for
a lower  margin  per  unit, while  growers  may
tend  to bargain  more  aggressively  because  of
the lower prices associated with large supplies.
When seasonal supplies are low,  on the other
hand, processors may attempt to achieve larger
per-unit  margins  to cover  fixed  costs,  while
growers  may  bargain  less  aggressively  since
their price  will be higher due to the reduced
supply.  Lagged  processed-product  price  and
cost  reflect  the  processors  ex post profit  ex-
perience.  When  previous-year  processor  re-
turns  are  relatively  high,  processors  may  be
less resistant and growers more aggressive; the
reverse might be expected when past processor
returns  are low.
Because  supply  and lagged  cost also  affect
processed-product  price  expectations,  their
possible  separate  effects  on M cannot  be  de-
termined.  But if the hypothesis  is correct,  the
derivatives of supply and lagged cost on farm
price will  be reduced  in absolute  value  since
M is subtracted from the expected processed-
product price.
The final price-predicting  equation. Substi-
tuting equation (3) in (1) expressed in deflated
values;  replacing  EPCDt with  bPCDt_  +  et;
assuming M to be at least potentially  affected
by  (QPNt +  SNt),  PPDt-,, and  PCDt_1, and
consolidating terms yields a linear function of
the following general  form:
(4) PFD,  = bo + b,(QPN, + SN,)
+ b2PPDt,  + b3PCDtl
+ b4QTMN2t  + bD74 + vt,
where v is a complex random variable. If QPN,
can be regarded as predetermined with respect
to PFD,  (as in the case of cling peaches), equa-
tion (4) may be estimated as a single equation
which predicts the price outcomes of the bar-
gaining process.  Where  a raw product  has al-
ternative  uses such as fresh, canned,  or dried,
or  where  contracts  are  signed  at  the  time  of
planting as for most processed vegetables, QPN
may  be  a  current  endogenous  variable.  This
then requires specification of  allocation or sup-
ply functions and joint estimation of(4) as part
of a simultaneous system. The outcomes of the
bargaining  process  would  be  predicted  from
the resulting  reduced-form  equation  with  re-
spect to the raw product price.
Estimation Results
Equation  (4) was estimated using data for the
period  1956 to  1982 (26 observations because
of  the inclusion of lagged variables), with  1983
and  1984  observations  used  as  a prediction
test.  The variables and units of measurement
are  defined in  table  1. Because  the  quantity
processed  (QP) is considered  essentially  pre-
determined for cling peaches, the equation was
estimated by single-equation  procedures.  Be-
cause of some indication of serial correlation
in the disturbances,  it  was  specified  as  first-
order  autoregressive  and estimated by maxi-
mum  likelihood.  The  estimation  results  are
given in table 2.
Table 2 includes three variations on the ba-
sic model.  Equation (a) is the linear model as
given by equation (4).  Equation (b) measures
all variables  except  D74 in logs.  This formu-
lation is not strictly consistent with the result
that would be obtained by substituting a log-
arithmic  processed-product  price-expectation
function  in equation  (1)  but is included  as  a
simplified  approximation  of a nonlinear for-
mulation.  Equation  (c)  expresses  prices  and
costs in logs of nominal values  with the price
level  entered  as  a  linear  variable  in logs.  A
model  fully linear in all variables with prices
and  costs in nominal values  was  rejected be-
cause this form  does not permit the  effect  of
quantity on price to increase with increases in
the general price  level.
The coefficients of all of the equations have
the theoretically expected signs and all are sta-
tistically highly significant. Measured in terms
of deflated  values,  the R2's  for equations  (a)
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and (b) are modest. However, if computed with
respect to the wider variance of nominal prices,
the R2 values are much higher,  as in equation
(c).5
The last  column  of table  2  gives  the  root
mean  square  errors  (RMSE) with  respect  to
prediction of nominal prices expressed in orig-
inal  (not logged) values.  The similarity of the
RMSEs  and  coefficient  errors  among  equa-
tions suggests that it would be difficult to argue
that  one  is inherently  superior  to the others.
All provide good fits to the historical data and
consistent coefficient estimates. The linear form
shows slightly larger t-ratios but also a slightly
larger RMSE in nominal terms.
The functions  in table 2 indicate that,  with
other  variables  held constant,  the  negotiated
farm price has decreased with increases in the
annual total supply of peaches relative to pop-
ulation (QPSN), has  increased with increases
in previous  year FOB canner price  of canned
peaches  (PPDL),  and  has  decreased  with  a
measure  of previous-year  processing  cost per
case  (PCDL). Equation  (a)  indicates  that  in
1974, the deflated farm price moved to a level
about  $17.80  per ton  above  previous  levels
(with  other  variables  constant).  That  impact
was modified subsequently by decreases in the
movement indicator,  QTMN2, which  reflects
a downtrend  in demand.
The  magnitude  of the  coefficient  for  the
lagged processing cost variable (PCDL) merits
some  special comment.  Since the conversion
ratio  between  raw and canned peaches  is ap-
proximately  fifty-three  cases  of  twenty-four
number  21/2  cans per ton,  if a change  in pro-
cessing cost with other variables constant were
passed immediately to the farm price, the coef-
ficient for PCDL would be near fifty-three rath-
er than the value of approximately  seventeen
in equation  (a).  The  lower  figure  appears  to
reflect  two  types  of behavioral  adjustments.
First,  lagged  costs  are an imperfect projector
of actual  processing  costs,  so  processors  re-
spond only partially to an observed change  in
cost, especially  since such costs may include a
significant  fixed component  that  need not be
covered each year.  Second, as indicated by the
5  Note that the prediction form for equation  (a) is
PFD, = bo(l  - p) + pPFD,_, + b,(QSPN, - pQSPN,,)
+ b2(PPDL,-  pPPDL, ,) + b,(PCDL,-  pPCDL, ,)
+  b,(QTMN2,-  pQTMN2,)  +  b,  b(D74,-  pD74,_)
and  similarly for equations  (b) and (c).  The b's refer to the coef-
ficients given  in the table.
Table  1.  Variable Identification
Variable  Definition
PFD  California  farm price  of cling peaches, dol-
lars  per ton, deflated by the personal con-
sumption  expenditure deflator (PCE =
1.0  in  1967)
PPD  FOB processor price per case  of 24 no.  21/2
can peaches,  deflated,  crop year,  1 June-
31  May
PCD  Representative  average  processing cost per
case  of 24  no.  21/2 can peaches, deflated
N  U.S.  total population,  1 July millions
QP  No.  1 quality peaches sold to processors,
tons
QPN  QP  N
S  Carry-in  stocks of canned peaches and fruit
cocktail  on 1 June  farm weight equiva-
lent, tons
SN  S  N
QPSN  Total supply, tons per million U.S.  popula-
tion (QPN + SN)
QTMN  Annual total crop-year movement of
canned peaches  and fruit cocktail,  cases
of 24  no. 2
1/2 cans per thousand U.S.
population
QTMN2  /2(QTMN,_, - QTMN_2)
D74  Shift variable, D = 0 from  1957  to 1973,
1.0 from  1974 on
Note: The data series used in the analysis and descriptions of data
sources are available from the author.
price-setting  model  used  to  derive  the  pro-
cessed  product  expected  price  (EPPD), pro-
cessors  may  compensate  for  increased  pro-
cessing  cost by setting higher FOB prices  for
the processed  product as well  as lowering the
farm  price.  However,  increases  in the actual
FOB price  lead to increases  in the stocks  car-
ried over to the next period.  This,  along with
the reduced movement at the higher FOB price,
shifts the bargaining range downward the next
year and so reduces farm price. Eventually, the
system  adjusts  so  that  the  full  impact  of a
change in processing cost, with other variables
constant,  is reflected in the farm  price;  but it
is a dynamic process  rather than an instanta-
neous adjustment.
The final test of the model is not how well
it explains  the  past but how  well it predicts
beyond  the  data set.  A poor prediction  may
indicate  a  weakness  of the  model  or reveal
some change in structure not accounted for by
variations in the explanatory variables. A lim-
ited test is provided  by utilizing the equations
estimated with  1957-82  data to predict farm
prices  for  1983 and  1984. The predicted  and
actual values  are compared  in table  3.
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Table  3.  Price Prediction Comparisons for 1983  and 1984
Equation  Deflated  Valuesa  Nominal  Valuesa Equation
and Year  PFD  PFD,  PFD - PFDp  SF
b PF  PF,  PF - PF
(1)  (2)
(a)  1983  61.83
C 73.30  -11.47  5.75  162.0
c 192.0  -30.0
1984  67.58  75.87  -8.29  6.45  183.0  205.6  -22.6
In PFD  (In PFD)  In PFD - (In PFD),  PF  PF,  PF - PF,
(b)  1983  4.1243  4.3437  -. 2194  .0928  162.0  201.7  -39.7
1984  4.2133  4.3046  -. 0901  .1034  183.0  200.6  -17.6
In PF  (In PF)p  In PF  - (In PF)  PF  PF,  PF - PF,
(c)  1983  5.0876  5.2905  -. 2029  .0937  162.0
b 198.4  -36.4
1984  5.2095  5.2954  -. 0859  .1031  183.0  199.4  -16.4
a p subscript indicates  a predicted value.
b Standard error of forecast.  Computed by adding dummy indicators (0-1) for  1983 and 1984 as suggested by Salkever.
c  In  1983 the California  Crop Reporting Service  reported  a farm  price of $162  per ton ($61.83  deflated),  while  the CCPA reported a
price of $148  per ton ($56.40 deflated).  In other  years CCPA and CCRS prices were nearly identical.
It  should  be noted  first that  1983  was  ex-
tremely unusual with respect to weather.  Crop
forecasts at the time CCPA prices were estab-
lished were much higher than actually realized,
and there were uncommon quality variations.
In a telephone conversation, one industry rep-
resentative  remarked  that  "1983  was  so  un-
usual that it should be thrown out for all com-
parative  purposes."  The  CCPA  reported  an
average  farm price of $148 per ton, while the
California Crop Reporting Service reported an
average  farm  price  of $162  per ton.  In most
other years  the CCPA and CCRS prices were
nearly identical.
Table  3 indicates  that in  1983,  even  using
the  higher  CCRS  value of $162  per  ton,  all
equations  substantially  overpredict  the  farm
price.  The  1984  price  predictions  are  closer,
falling within about one standard error of the
forecast.  Overall, while the model clearly pre-
dicts too  high a  price  in both  years,  the pre-
dictions  are  within  the  probability  range  of
past errors.6 However,  it is  possible  that the
deviations  may  reflect  a  more  permanent
structural  shift.  Following  a period  in which
several  processing  firms  left the industry  be-
cause of low returns, the remaining firms may
strive  for more  profitable  margins.  Another
factor  not  explicitly  considered  in  the  1984
prediction  was  the  first  flow  of  imported
6 Referring to equations  (b) and (c),  it is  well known  that pre-
dictions of original values are biased when the dependent variable
is  in  logs. Kennedy  suggests a  correction  for  such  bias but with
some  possible increase  of mean square  error.  No correction  was
made here.
peaches  into the  United  States  beginning  in
1983.  The  quantity did not reach  significant
proportions until 1984, then affecting the 1985
farm price  prediction.  The variable  QTMN2,
representing  trends  in  past  movement,  in-
cludes  exports;  and it  is  possible  that future
predictions might be improved by treating im-
ports as negative  exports.7
Summary Comments
The results of this study demonstrate that it is
possible to obtain consistent estimates  of the
relationship between farm  price  and quantity
of raw product produced  and sold to  proces-
sors even though the market structure is such
that a farm-level demand function  cannot be
defined.  Prediction  under  a bargaining  struc-
ture seems likely to involve a greater variance
than might be expected when markets are com-
petitive; but, for cling peaches at least, the coef-
ficients of the important explanatory variables
of the price-predicting equation were large rel-
ative to their standard errors. Such farm price
predictions are essential for policy analysis and
economic projections.
7 In assessing how  well a model predicts,  it may be of interest
to ascertain  not only the nature of the actual deviations but how
well it predicts relative to alternative time-series forecasting  models.
To that end, an autoregressive moving average model (ARMA, 1,
1)  was estimated for the deflated farm price series. The historical
RMSE for the  ARMA  model was well above  the RMSE  values
in table 2, although the predictions for 1983 and 1984 were similar
to those obtained  with the structural model.  Since the time-series
analysis predicted no better and lacks a clear economic foundation
and interpretation,  that approach was rejected.
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It may be observed that the price-predicting
equation  involves  essentially  the  same  vari-
ables as would be included under the assump-
tion of perfect competition.  This suggests that
precise identification of the competitive struc-
ture may not be required if the primary focus
is on estimating  a relationship  between farm
price  and output.  That is, if the structure  re-
mains  constant,  the  estimated function  may
provide consistent predictions even if  the mar-
ket is incorrectly  assumed to be  competitive,
and vice  versa.  This may be quite important
because  it  is  often  very  difficult  to obtain  a
clear indication  of the specific  nature and ex-
tent of imperfectly competitive behavior from
the limited information  available.  Of course,
if the  competitive structure  changes,  the  esti-
mated price-predicting  equation  may no lon-
ger be valid  since both the  slope and level  of
the function may be affected.
The virtue of generality for price prediction
purposes  may  also be  a  limitation  for  other
purposes. Although the model is applicable to
an  imperfectly  competitive  bargaining  struc-
ture,  it  does not  provide  a  basis  for  distin-
guishing  whether  a particular  structure  is,  in
fact, competitive or noncompetitive.  Such de-
termination requires additional and more de-
tailed data pertaining to individual firm costs
and pricing practices.
It should  be noted,  finally,  that analysis  of
the  full  impact  of a policy  that would  affect
quantity  produced  may  require  a  dynamic
model of the total commodity system not just
a single-period price  prediction equation.
[Received April 1986; final revision
received November 1986.]
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